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Abstract
The negotiation with dominant suppliers usually drives to locked-in situation in which buyers have no choice but to accept the 
given conditions. Commonly found in the industry, there is a need to provide new insights to practitioners to leverage competition. 
Specifically, researchers apply and test concepts from Game-Theory in a real supplier selection process in the port cranes industry. 
Our research shows that existing literature in Game-Theory is mostly descriptive, very focused on auctions and has still limitations 
regarding the design, application and impact of these supplier selection concepts. Therefore, it is presented one of the first field 
studies presenting the application of game-trees and backward induction (tools from Game-Theory) for the design and execution 
of a real bargaining, including the hows and whys of our decisions. The results suggest that using Game-Theory can enhance the 
chance to have better negotiation outcomes by predicting the possible outcomes and prescribing the best fitting game to be design 
in order to increase competition among suppliers. 
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1. Introduction
‘How can we leverage competition if we have dominant 
suppliers?’ This is the question that managers from the case 
company (a European manufacturer of harbour cranes) of 
this paper asked to the research team while working together 
in the development and deployment of purchasing strategies. 
Precisely, this paper stems from an industrial challenge to 
leverage competition: the second highest procured category 
(Cat-E) -in terms of total product costs- of the case com-
pany had a dominant supplier (supplier-S). This Supplier-S 
had been successively imposing prices levered on its posi-
tion as a renowned multinational company acting worldwide 
and with an estimated  European market share for the Cat-E 
of more than 60% of the new harbour crane projects. Since 
the case company needed to reduce costs and supply-risk to 
satisfy the market needs of their clients, they were forced 
to look for an innovative approach to conduct their supplier 
selection process for its Cat-E. 
In fact, to leverage competition among suppliers is not a 
new challenge to industry since it is widely accepted that 
purchasing policies can significantly improve sales margins 
through realizing substantial cost savings and provide an op-
portunity for firms to contribute to a position of competitive 
advantage (Van Weele 2009). At a strategic level, industry 
has generally taken over several purchasing methods (Kral-
jic 1983) when executing category management and pur-
chasing portfolio activities (Gelderman and Van Weele 2005; 
Monczka and others 2008; Tassabehji 2010). Whilst the use 
of some of these methods can help purchasing practitioners 
in developing suitable strategies, the deployment of specific 
purchasing policies and practices from the strategic to the 
tactical purchasing level is primarily deployed on the tactical 
purchasing process: the activities related to the definition of 
purchasing specifications, search and selection of the appro-
priate suppliers, and the preparation and execution of any 
supplier negotiations in order to establish and sign the legal 
contract (Van Weele 2009). Among these activities, supplier 
selection is considered a critical task that can act as a stra-
tegic contributor to the firm (Krause, Pagell, and Curkovic 
2001) although it is also considered as a potential source of 
complex and difficult decision making challenges (Huang 
and Keskar 2007; Yigin et al. 2007). 
Therefore, this paper discusses if the supplier selection can 
benefit from a more systematic application of Game-Theory 
(GT), which can provide new perspectives to these situations 
(e.g. be utilised for prediction of the negotiations and there-
fore be able to better design these beforehand). Literature re-
view shows that there is limited knowledge about the design 
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and application (hows) of supplier selection processes based 
on GT (Hawkins, Randall, and Wittmann 2009; Tassabeh-
ji 2010; Schoenherr et al. 2012; Hsin Chang, Tsai, and Hsu 
2013; Spina et al. 2013) with current research being mainly 
descriptive or prescriptive (whats) in nature. Additionally, 
to the best of our knowledge there are scarce examples of 
empirical GT applications in bargaining within purchasing 
negotiations. Hence, the aim of this paper is twofold: first, 
it will provide new insights about the design of a supplier 
selection process -specifically the usage of game-trees and 
backward induction for bargaining- based on GT. Second, it 
will show evidence of the impact that a more systematic ap-
plication of GT can have on the effectiveness of the supplier 
selection process, even when there are dominant suppliers in 
the category.
2. Fundamentals of GT and its applica-
tion to supplier selection
Since the 1950s GT has become an important field of study 
and is now an important methodology for researchers in 
many disciplines. GT is mainly used on situations in which 
players have conflicting interests. In other words, GT is a set 
of analytical tools designed to help us understand when it is 
observed how decision-makers interact, assuming that these 
pursue well-defined exogenous objectives (i.e. they are ra-
tional) and take into account their knowledge or expectations 
of other decision-makers' behaviour (i.e. they reason strate-
gically). These interactions are the games and are “a descrip-
tion of strategic interactions that include the constraints on 
the actions that the players can take and the players' interest 
but does not specify the actions that the players do take” (Os-
borne & Rubinstein 1994). 
Every game is played by a set of rules (Dutta 1999), which 
specify who is playing (players), what they are playing with 
(strategies), when each player gets to play (what is the se-
quence) and how much they stand to gain or lose (payoffs). 
The games can be classified depending on three dimensions: 
(1) Noncooperative vs. cooperative games: a player is the 
basic entity in all GT models, whether an individual 
(noncooperative) or a group of individuals (coopera-
tive) are deciding.
(2) Strategic vs. Extensive games: timing of decision 
making, whether it is made simultaneously (strategic 
games) or consecutively (extensive games) by players.
(3) Perfect vs. Imperfect information: if the players have 
the full information about each others’ moves (perfect 
information) or not (imperfect information).
Any game has solutions that are described as “a systemic 
description of the outcomes that may emerge in a family of 
games” (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). GT suggests reason-
able solutions for classes of games and examines their prop-
erties, i.e. may be used for explanation, prediction or pre-
scription in various circumstances (Dixit and Skeath 1999). 
Mechanism Design theory (2007 Nobel prize in Economics) 
is an evolution of GT and goes a step further by selecting the 
optimal rules of the game (Börgers 2015). Therefore, the au-
thors argue that if a buyer is able to design a supplier selec-
tion process with a sufficient number of qualified suppliers 
(players) that compete in a predefined process (sequence) in 
order to win a pre-established award (payoff), then the pos-
sible decisions from suppliers (strategies or choices) could 
be influenced by the buyer’s interest – an interesting angle 
that cannot be easily covered by other scientific approaches.
 As a field of research within GT, bargaining theory is fo-
cused on explaining how a surplus, generated in every eco-
nomic transaction, will be divided by predicting the price at 
which the transaction will take place. If there is more than 
one course of action for all individuals and there is a con-
flict over which course of action to pursue then, some form 
of negotiation over how to resolve the conflict is necessary. 
Regarding the application of GT to supplier selection, two 
generic approaches for supplier selection are often identified 
within the literature: negotiation and auctioning. Bargaining 
Theory (typically applied to negotiations) and Auction Theo-
ry are based on the principles of GT, and they aim to promote 
competition or cooperation between suppliers to enhance 
the results of the supplier selection process (Wyld 2011; 
Chaturvedi, Beil, and Martínez-de-Albéniz 2014). When ap-
plying bargaining theory to the supplier selection process, 
GT suggests the use of the extensive form games, i.e. a de-
tailed description of the sequential structure of the decision 
problems encountered by players in a strategic situation, in 
which players can have perfect or imperfect information. 
For their analysis, game-trees are utilised and the method for 
solving is known as rollback or backward induction (Dixit 
and Skeath 1999). 
The literature covering the empirical application of GT 
for bargaining and negotiation for supplier selection in pur-
chasing was evaluated by searching combinations of such 
terms as “bargaining”, “game-theory”, “game-tree”, “back-
ward-induction”, “purchasing”, “procurement”, “supplier 
selection” or “negotiation” in the major databases (Inform/
ProQuest, EBSCO Host, and Science Direct). Initially, a 
selection of articles from this search was done, including 
new sources identified by tracing the references included in 
these articles (Webster and Watson 2002). That work was 
continued till additional searches gave no additional works 
addressing relevant issues. The usage of this process did not 
allow the researchers to find relevant field studies utilising 
game-trees and backward induction when designing and ex-
ecuting a game (supplier awarding/selection) with participa-
tion of practitioners. 
Therefore –and to the best of our knowledge- it can be stat-
ed that empirical evidences of GT application for bargaining, 
by utilising game-trees and backward induction, during the 
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design and execution of supplier selection in purchasing are 
limited. Neither academics nor practitioners have discussed 
thoroughly field cases that could provide valuable insights 
for this research path. Therefore, it is proposed the following 
research question: How can GT, specifically the usage of 
game-trees and backward induction for bargaining, be 
systematically applied to enhance the effectiveness of the 
negotiation process in supplier selection? 
Providing more details on the actual works on GT in sup-
plier selection will be of great interest to both practitioners 
and academics in purchasing management. Research that 
empirically tests the outcome predictions of GT models 
would enable the refinement of existing theories and result-
ing consequences (Mithas and Jones 2007). Further empir-
ical research would also help practitioners in the design of 
more effective selection processes and integrate those into 
their procurement strategies for improving firm’s perfor-
mance (Weele and Raaij 2014). 
3. Methodology
Action research (AR) has been selected as the methodo-
logical basis for this work. The aim of AR is to contribute to 
the academic research and provide solutions to practitioners’ 
problems, with the researcher(s) being actively involved in 
the process of change (Susman and Evered 1978; Eden and 
Huxham 1996; Coughlan and Coghlan 2002; Vignali and 
Zundel 2003).  
Precisely, that research was carried out in collaboration 
with a European manufacturer of harbour cranes that has 
been operating for over 50 years. The case company has 
been highly impacted by container handling industry evolu-
tion, which has gone through significant changes as a result 
of globalisation, high volume of maritime transport and in-
creased levels of standardisation. Nowadays, the crane sys-
tem market is largely dominated by a Chinese organisation 
having 70% market share, with the remaining 30% being 
shared amongst smaller manufacturers. Due to the increased 
pressure to provide engineer-to-order solutions on a shorter 
lead time, lower cost and higher quality, the case company 
launched an ambitious strategic procurement plan for the pe-
riod 2013-2016. This strategic procurement plan contained a 
strong focus on achieving tangible improvements in the pro-
curement process by reducing the final costs of the parts ac-
quired from their suppliers. The challenge described in this 
paper stemmed from the main working fields of the strategic 
procurement plan, namely to increase competition (explicitly 
to have significant cost reduction) in the purchasing category 
Cat-E that had a dominant Supplier-S. A rapid analysis of the 
costs regarding Cat-E along the period 2003-2012 showed 
that comparable projects had always maintained or increased 
their costs. Therefore, the company wanted an innovative ap-
proach for an effective negotiation, which provided an inter-
esting case for academics in order to develop, structure and 
test new knowledge.
AR generates emergent theory, which in words of Cough-
lan and Coghlan (2002, p.229) “emerges through the unfold-
ing of a series of events as the designated issue is confronted 
and attempts at resolution by the members of the organisa-
tion with the help of the action researcher”. During AR stud-
ies the cycle of planning-taking action- observation-evalua-
tion occurs several times (Susman and Evered 1978; Perry 
and Zuber-Skerritt 1992; Coughlan and Coghlan 2002). This 
continuous inquiry-reflection process that characterises AR 
means that learning is gained in action: since operations 
management research often requires learning from applica-
tion, AR has become a more widely used approach for this 
discipline (Westbrook 1995; Coughlan and Coghlan 2002).
Also recent literature on the field of purchasing recognises 
that AR helps to embrace the “complexity of buyer-supplier 
relationships, generating important theoretical insights and 
relevant managerial implications” (Maestrini et al. 2016). To 
be out in the field and in close contact with the environments 
being studied can enhance any theoretical proposal (Hand-
field and Melnyk 1998), especially valid for GT applied to 
supplier selection as it is still at the stage of theory-building. 
Additionally, in the field of applied GT researchers have of-
ten used laboratories. This approach has considerable limita-
tions since real world initiatives are significantly more com-
plex and as such field studies are necessary to complement 
insights from laboratories (Mithas and Jones 2007). 
Therefore, the researchers embarked on the project with 
the aim to design and support the execution of a GT based 
negotiation. The project team included researchers and key 
persons of the company (Purchasing Director, Purchasing 
Expert, Innovation Director, Logistics Director and Chief 
Electrical Engineer). The practitioners involved made possi-
ble a continuous review of the actions that were being taken 
throughout the process, which is a critical element to en-
hance the validity of AR studies.  In addition, after complet-
ing the supplier selection process, several semi-structured 
interviews and group discussions with the management were 
conducted. The project team that carried out the game with 
Supplier-S had also a separate session to reflect on the pro-
cess and discuss the learnings from the novel experience.
The main data collection and analysis period lasted for 5 
months during 2013. The data collection consisted of records 
from direct participation in meetings during the entire design 
and execution of the negotiation process, semi-structured 
interviews and company internal documentation. The lead 
researcher was the main responsible for the design the sup-
plier selection process and played an advisory role during the 
onsite negotiation with Supplier-S. 
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Table 1 Process for designing a GT 
based supplier negotiation process
4. Developing & implementing a GT
based supplier selection process
Our process (table 1) aimed to support the case company 
to get a more efficient result of their supplier selection. It 
allowed the case company to better design the negotiation 
strategies, predict the outcomes and get more competitive 
bids. Key pieces of existing research have been utilised, be-
ing stage 4 and 5 our key contribution. It has been detailed 
which key decisions to make and how apply GT elements to 
properly execute the game (i.e. bargaining with Supplier-S 
of the Cat-E in the project belonging to Client-P):
Stage Purpose What to do
1) Analyze strategic im-
portance & complexity 
of supply market for a 
given category
Assess purchasing category, 
evaluate purchasing power vs 
important suppliers and implicit 
risks in the supply
1) Quantitative data gathering, e.g. No. of released suppliers for 
the category, No. of potential suppliers not released yet, purchasing 
volume (PVO) per supplier and the category; 2) 2. Supply category 
according to Kraljic’s matrix by using either the consensus, one-by-
one or weighted-factor score method; 3) Plot results 
2) Evaluate supply cat-
egory and generic pur-
chasing strategies
Identify most suitable generic 
strategies for each category & 
possible generic purchasing 
strategies 
1) Understand generic purchasing strategies per quadrant; 2) Decide 
what strategy to utilize for the category. Asses the relative power 
buyer-supplier and its impact on the strategy selection; 3) Discuss 
alignment of the selected category strategy with purchasing strategy 
for the Kraljic’s Matrix
3) Evaluate negotiating
conditions for category
The definition of the current sit-
uation of the category regarding 
the competitiveness
1) Evaluate number of released suppliers that could take part in 
awarding process; 2) Gain commitment regarding awarding from all 
decision making areas; 3) Assess level of attractiveness of potential 
contract for supplier; 4) Set awarding target (e.g. price reduction) 
and prepare a possible prediction for the awarding; 5) Preselect a 
group of suppliers and send a Request For Quotation (RFQ) that can 
qualify them for the awarding process
4) Negotiation game
design
Define the negotiation game, i.e. 
players, rules and information
1) Specify which suppliers will be invited to the game (players) 
based on the RFQ responses; 2) Design game details on strategy, 
game sequence and information: (a) cooperative or non-coopera-
tive game, (b) strategic game (all decisions at the same time) or 
extensive game (one decision after the other) and (c) information 
is perfect or imperfect and how it will be given to players; 3) For 
extensive-form game, develop decision tree and apply backward 
induction (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (Osborne, Rubinstein 
1994) for predicting possible results and adapt the game design; 4) 
For auctions: decide auction type based on e.g. Dutta (1999), taking 
into account the prior RFQ received; 5) Provide management with 
detailed information to ensure commitment required with this stage 
of the process
5) Negotiation game ex-
ecution
The execution the negotiation 
game as defined in stage 4
1) Develop standard contract with price & condition liability for 
suppliers and get signatures; 2) Communicate negotiation game 
rules to players (suppliers), according to the game design developed 
in the stage 4; 3) Execute game exactly as defined; 4) Close game 
(awarding) and assign the item to the winning supplier.
Stage 1 & Stage 2 & Stage 3 
The researchers conducted meetings and semi-structured 
interviews with the company’s top management and collect-
ed quantitative information to support our initial evaluation 
of the negotiation. The purchasing category was then evalu-
ated using Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio matrix (1983) (fig-
ure 1) by the consensus method (Gelderman and Van Weele 
2003). Outcome was to position the Cat-E in the Strategic 
quadrant. 
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Figure 1 Kraljic’s matrix and purchas-
ing strategies (Gelderman and Van 
Weele 2003). 
The number of released suppliers for Cat-E was initially 
two. Considering the quadrant and the possible strategies 
the researchers and case company agreed that the suitable 
strategy for Cat-E should be to “terminate partnership, find 
new supplier” in order to promote competition and move the 
category from Strategic to Leverage. Interviews confirmed 
the need of exploiting purchasing power and achieving cost 
reduction. 
The research project was focused on the project negotia-
tion with an existing client (Client-P) for the Cat-E with two 
suppliers invited to participate in the project’s RFQ (Suppli-
er-S and Supplier-A). Prior group discussions to gain com-
mitment from the case company management were held. The 
negotiation had a clear cost reduction target (Target1) which 
was the expected payoff to achieve. This aimed to achieve 
an important reduction in the total cost in comparison to the 
previous cost for the same harbour crane for the same Cli-
ent-P (Cost1). During the initial negotiation, the case com-
pany eliminated Supplier-A from the awarding process due 
to the Client-P’s veto (existing cranes were equipped with 
Supplier-S’s equipment and they wanted a higher standard-
ized construction and maintenance for their harbours). This 
veto to supplier-A made the negotiation for the Cat-E even 
more difficult, since at this stage only Supplier-S would be 
involved and, in consequence, that supplier will not have in-
centives to improve its cost-level on the RFQ. 
Stage 4: Negotiation game design
Based on our process this game was designed to be a:
(1) non-cooperative game;
(2) extensive-form game (i.e. decisions are made consec-
utively)
(3) with imperfect information. 
If Supplier-A had participated in the awarding process, a 
strategic form game could have been designed, e.g. Suppli-
er-A and -S competing in an auction. An auction could have 
been developed to make Supplier-S to compete against itself, 
but it was considered risky. Thus, the utilisation an exten-
sive form game was deemed to be more adequate, since this 
allowed to have a structured negotiation and the introduc-
tion of other alternatives for certain part of the negotiation 
if needed and technically feasible (denote e.g. strategy-b in 
figure 2, when the scope of the Supplier-S is narrowed). The 
extensive form negotiation design was modelled utilizing a 
game tree (figure 2) and the analysis was done via backward 
induction. The imperfect information was mainly focused on 
the pay-off structure, the technical feasibility and risk evalu-
ation of the alternative strategies to follow. 
The most challenging -and also critical to success- task 
while modelling the negotiation through the game-tree was 
the evaluation of the expected payoff for the Supplier-S. This 
task was led by the Innovation Director, Chief Electrical En-
gineer and the Purchasing Director of the case company, with 
the methodical support of the Lead Researcher. This work 
implied a detailed value analysis and reverse engineering of 
the product supplied by Supplier-S in the Cat-E. The analy-
sis provided a deep understanding of the product functions 
and the related costs drivers. In addition, very detailed cost 
estimations of the production costs of the Supplier-S were 
carried out. For that purpose, the case company integrated 
selected sub-suppliers of the products contained in the Cat-E 
and acted as a potential future manufacturer2 .
2 The results from that analysis made the case company to launch a parallel initiative to insource the manufacturing competencies of the Cat-E. In the period 
mid-2015 to mid-2016 the very first crane with an own product of the Cat-E was sold, manufactured and installed.  
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The historical negotiation environment on the Cat-E dur-
ing the previous years is modelled on the upper branch (sub-
game 1) of the game-tree. Here, if supplier-S were the unique 
one competing, the case company had only the chance to 
purchase the whole range from Supplier-S (decision node 
1 and strategy-a) and consequently, Supplier-S could use 
its power position and impose prices (decision node 2 and 
strategy-c) or to cooperate and look for a price reduction 
(decision nodes 2 and strategy-d). In this specific case, GT 
proposes to solve the situation via backward induction, start-
ing from the last decision node and going back to the first 
decision node considering the possible payoffs (the higher 
payoff for any player is the better):
• If Supplier-S decides on strategy-c they would have a
payoff of 1800 whereas if they choose strategy-d the
payoff would be 1764. If Supplier-S acts rationally
and there is no incentive to change the decision based
on the available pay-offs, GT predicts that Supplier-S
will always adopt strategy-c. On the other hand, if the
case company analyses the resulting payoffs from the
strategies-c and -d, the case company would always
prefer the Supplier-S to choose strategy-d (pay-off of
Target1-60) than strategy-c (pay-off of Target1-216).
• In conclusion, the prediction of that subgame 1 will
always finish with Supplier-S choosing strategy-c and
case company accepting that situation since they have
no other alternative in the decision node 1. In fact, that
was the real environment happening during the period
2003-2012, confirmed by the analysis that were carried
out and the preparatory meetings with the case compa-
ny.
Because of this initial analysis, the research team proposed 
the creation of an additional alternative in the decision node 
1. If Supplier-A had been part of the negotiation process, it
would have allowed to outline different scenarios in the de-
cision node 1, but since they were vetoed from the process 
it was necessary to create an additional alternative.  This 
was the creation of the strategy-b that proposed to limit the 
purchasing scope from Supplier-S. The strategy-a was really 
the best possible strategy for the case company in terms of 
pay-off (best case Target1-60, worst case Target1-216), but 
strategy-b was introduced to create a credible threat on Sup-
plier-S: the aim was to create an option in which Supplier-S 
could have a worse payoff than in any other possible out-
come within strategy-b. This meant that the case company 
had an additional strategy in the first decision node, which 
also created more possible strategies for the Supplier-S in the 
second decision node. Analysing the complete game tree by 
means of backward induction suggests: 
• If it is started by analysing the second decision node,
Supplier-S would have two possible scenarios. The
subgame 1 is choosing between strategy-c and -d, and
it has been already predicted that Supplier-S will al-
ways choose strategy-c.
• The subgame 2 makes the Supplier-S to choose be-
tween strategy-e and -f. Analysing the pay-offs, Sup-
plier-S will always choose strategy-e, since strategy-f
will provide no pay-off as it means not supplying to the
case company. Therefore, it can be predicted that if the
case company selects the strategy-b, Supplier-S will be
forced to choose strategy-e.
• The analysis enables the prediction that choosing strat-
egy-b in node 1, and strategy-e in node 2 is clearly not
the most efficient solution for both parties since the
strategy-a in node 1, and strategies-c and -d in node
2 have better pay-offs for all. If the Supplier-S has the
chance to choose between strategy-c and -d, the first
will be always selected, but this has a lower pay-off
for the case company. As a result, the game structure
should be modified to eliminate strategy-c being an
option. Researchers and case company developed a
draft contract specifying that Supplier-S is committed
to reduce the economical offer if the whole project is
Figure 2 Game tree of the case study
43Dirección y Organización
Miguel Mediavilla et al. / Dirección y Organización 67 (2019) 37-45
assigned: thus, encouraging Supplier-S to choose strat-
egy-d if they wanted to discard strategies-e and -f, 
which had lower pay-offs for Supplier-S. The contract 
also included additional penalty clauses for delays and 
late technical modifications, which should further en-
courage Supplier-S to collaborate in price negotiations 
(strategy-d). 
Stage 5: Game execution
The negotiation process strictly followed the design to 
avoid having new variables and strategies that had not been 
taking into account previously. Case company introduced 
strategy-b and communicated to Supplier-S. Under this strat-
egy-b, the model predicts that Supplier-S would have chosen 
the-e strategy even if this is not the most efficient option for 
both parties. This created a threat on the Supplier-S that led 
that supplier to reconsider strategy-a and take a more col-
laborative approach when negotiating the price. The power 
position strategy-c suddenly becomes irrelevant or not real. 
However, Supplier-S offered strategy-d to the case compa-
ny, after having received the communication that the case 
company went for the strategy-b, and this was accepted by 
the case company. Interesting insights emerged during the 
execution and helped us to strengthen our assumptions and 
predictions: e.g. Purchasing Director forgot his cell phone 
the day after the case company communicated that they were 
going to adopt strategy-b. Finally, CEO of Supplier-S called 
to CEO of the case company and this gave us valuable infor-
mation that supplier-S had not been expecting the strategy-b 
and that it was not a good solution for that supplier-S. It sup-
ported our prediction that Supplier-S would cooperate and 
propose strategy-d.
5. Results and conclusions
The validity of the findings and the quality of the research 
should be carefully evaluated by utilising criteria already 
identified in the literature: practical relevance, usefulness, 
theoretical novelty, applicability of the findings in other 
situations and research rigour (Kasanen, Lukka, and Siito-
nen 1993; Eden and Huxham 1996; Coughlan and Coghlan 
2002). This is particularly important as response to the com-
mon critique of AR “to brand it as consulting masquerading 
as research” (Coughlan and Coghlan 2002), as well as its 
lack of repeatability and generalisability since  focus it is 
used on solving specific problem in a given context. 
Action Research requires to demonstrate the practical rel-
evance and usefulness of the outcomes in a given context 
(Susman and Evered 1978; Kasanen, Lukka, and Siitonen 
1993; Eden and Huxham 1996; Coughlan and Coghlan 
2002). In the presented work, the case company had a clear 
target derived from a practical problem, i.e. get significant 
cost saving in the Cat-E by using innovative approaches 
when conducting the supplier selection process for that cat-
egory.  The design and executing of the negotiation carried 
out with the Supplier-S has shown that the case company 
has got cost saving in the Cat-E for the project of the Cli-
ent-P. Even though the Target1 has not been achieved, the 
outcome was Target1-60 and it has brought a significant cost 
reduction compared to the previous Target1-216 scenario. 
Moreover, having a systematic processes to apply GT to the 
supplier selection process could support practitioners since 
“(they) did not always know the rationale for the choice of 
parameters or how that might have affected cost savings” 
(Mithas and Jones 2007).
The project team members from the case company were 
highly satisfied since they could redirect the business rela-
tion with supplier-S after a long period of locked-in relation. 
The Target1-60 was considered as a very good result by the 
CEO and the Purchasing Director of the case company. In 
fact, the research team was invited to design and execute a 
similar supplier selection process as soon as this research 
was finished. The feedback sessions with the case company 
showed the following key comments from practitioners:
• The design phase of the negotiation has provided a tre-
mendous transparency for all the project team mem-
bers, even if they had different background or even lo-
cal interests related to their department. The game-tree
has been a powerful tool to align all the team (espe-
cially the engineering and purchasing areas) and have
a comprehensive understanding of the negotiation, the
possible decisions and the key levers that influence it.
• Executing GT based negotiations are worth only for
important procurement categories (in terms of purchas-
ing volume) since it is necessary to have support from
expert and requires a long preparation work.
This research has also shown its novelty by presenting in-
sights into the design of a GT based supplier selection pro-
cess for bargaining and the evaluation of its impact on the 
effectiveness of the supplier selection process. The literature 
review showed that there is a lack of field studies utilising 
game-trees and backward induction that present the design 
and execution of a game (supplier awarding/selection) to-
gether with practitioners. 
This work has therefore two main contribution: 
1. Proving that the application of GT, namely by game-
trees and backward induction for bargaining, can have
a profound influence in increasing the effectiveness of
the supplier selection process. The study of a real-world
bargaining case has enabled the researchers to respond
the calls for further empirical research in the applica-
tion of GT for negotiation and bargaining (Tassabehji,
2010), as well as to tackle the need for providing more
theoretical insights and managerial implications in the
buyer-supplier relation (Maestrini et al. 2016). The em-
pirical research can also help the refinement of existing
theories and resulting consequences (Mithas and Jones
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2007; Hawkins, Randall, and Wittmann 2009) as it has 
tested the outcome predictions of GT models. It has 
been also introduced how the design of more effective 
selection processes can be integrated into their pro-
curement strategies for improving firm’s performance 
(Weele and Raaij 2014), by e.g. using strategic port-
folio analysis (Kraljic in our process) and its strategic 
choices per quadrant, and linking it with the supplier 
selection process evaluation by means of game-theory.
2. Extending the knowledge on how GT principles can
be applied to enhance the outcomes of the supplier se-
lection process by understanding how game-trees and
backward induction for bargaining are used. This work
has described and justified the characteristics chosen
to design the supplier selection process – which has
not been extensively covered in the previous literature
(Mithas and Jones 2007; Wyld 2011). By providing de-
tailed insights on the how of the GT model for supplier
selection and discussing the why for choosing specif-
ic game design parameters, this work can contribute
towards a better understanding of the supplier selec-
tion design theory by means of GT. In other words, the
ability to predict a bargaining result (depending on the
hows and being aware of the whys) can be a powerful
mechanism to support practitioners in their continuous
search for more effective supplier management pro-
cesses.
Regarding the applicability of the findings in other situ-
ations, it is necessary to point out that Action Research is 
by nature specific to the context of action and does not look 
for creating universal knowledge (Coughlan and Coghlan 
2002). Anyhow, to understand the implications of the find-
ings in other contexts should be taken into account  (Eden 
and Huxham 1996; Coughlan and Coghlan 2002; Coghlan 
and Brannick 2014). Researchers are confident that our five-
stage process (presented in figure 1) can be put into practice 
in other organisations and sectors in their supplier selection 
processes after careful consideration of the appropriate strat-
egies for the particular purchasing category (Kraljic, 1983). 
The bargaining game characteristics could be influenced by 
the organisational context and the specific nature of each 
supplier selection process, therefore additional works from 
other procurement categories, companies and sectors would 
enrich the discussion of the applicability of our five-stage 
process. The research team have embarked on a wider re-
search project to extend the application of that process in 
the automotive, household appliances and civil engineering 
sectors.
Regarding the research rigour, researchers have put into 
practice several tactics within the Action Research for en-
suring validity of the study: the development of a research 
process, the creation of a research team, enacting the action 
research cycle continuously, and to subject assumptions to 
public testing. The interviews, data, observations and find-
ings had been structured, documented and reported for dis-
cussion with the case company. Data collection instruments 
were utilised during the different phases of the research (in-
terviews, database analysis, participant observation, feed-
back sessions, and informal discussion) to make possible the 
comparison and contrast findings at different stages of the 
project.
Even though this work has been focused on how to ap-
ply GT tools (game-trees and backward induction) for bar-
gaining purposes, the researchers consider that this case also 
represents an interesting observation of how to respond to 
dominant suppliers in negotiations. This response to domi-
nance has not been the main purpose for this work but the 
extension of the research from this angle may provide inter-
esting insights for practitioners, including how the product 
engineering and purchasing management can work together 
to weaken the dominance of supplier by redesigning prod-
ucts or changing specifications.
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